Norwich 1-0 Middlesbrough: Canaries flutter, Smoggies smoulder.

This was an intriguing and occasionally compelling contest between two hard-working sides with contrasting fortunes this season: Norwich, high flying in the Championship playoff places after last season's emphatic promotion from League 1, just snuck it ahead of Boro, the underachieving pre-season title favourites.

Following their unexpected midweek defeat to Crystal Palace, Norwich elected to drop their trademark diamond formation for a flat 4-4-2, with winger Antony McNamee surprisingly starting ahead of the Canaries' conductor last season, Wes Hoolahan. First choice centre-back Elliott Ward also made his return from a one-match suspension. Boro were the ones aiming to provide the sparkle in the centre of midfield with a defensively minded 4-3-1-2, precocious 17 year old Luke Williams drifting between Norwich's defensive and midfield lines. Boro captain Gary O'Neill started in an unusual position as carrilero on the left side of the diamond.


Approximate positions and movements of both sets of players in the first half. Note how O'Neil's forays forward and inside (the yellow line marking where he should be) effectively handed Norwich the right flank, leading to their winning goal.

All right first half (O'Neil gets homesick)

The main pattern of the game was established very early on in the first half. Thanks to their numerical advantage there, Boro found it easier to maintain possession in the centre, while Norwich found themselves having to work predominantly on the break. Norwich seemed fairly content in dealing with the threat Boro offered, tending to either win the ball or give away minor fouls high in their half before innocuous passes could emerge as more sinister attacks. With Leroy Lita and Kris Boyd well supervised by Elliott Ward and Leon Barnett, who both had fantastic games, one got the sense that Boro dictated the play while only occasionally exerting a threat on goal.

The movement of Luke Williams and Gary O'Neil presented the biggest concern for Norwich, but also their biggest outlet. Kevin Thomson remained deep (later, Richard Smallwood), and Nicky Bailey shuttled well, allowing Middlesbrough to retain the ball inside their half. Williams was often the player with the most room, waiting for service in the centre or drifting towards the right flank, providing width to Boro's midfield until their right-back Tony McMahon could overlap. The attacking intentions of McMahon and Bailey made Lappin, Fox and Steven Smith stay fairly deep. It was through Williams' influence that Boro gained some early corners, an O'Neil free-kick which Norwich keeper John Ruddy caught comfortably, and a long shot just wide of the post from Bailey. It was a mature performance from the youngster.

O'Neil, perhaps anxious as a right-footer on the left hand side, tended to move inwards into the space that Williams vacated. This made Boro lopsided, leaving Norwich with constant space on their right flank, and plenty of time to use it before O'Neil could get back and defend. Russell Martin got several key balls through to Simeon Jackson, and Andrew Crofts was a dynamic force in midfield, making charging runs from deep and unluckily striking the post after being left unmarked from a McNamee cross. Because of the sheer amount of time they were given down the right, Norwich were able to construct the better chances, and it was a move down this side which ultimately won them the game.

Anthony McNamee was Norwich's most direct player, with his constant runs at Matthew Bates on the counter-attack providing the most exciting moments of the match. Despite being left-footed, and consequently shown down the line by Bates numerous times, McNamee showed discipline in maintaining Norwich's width where O'Neil couldn't for Boro. His patience was ultimately rewarded. On the one occasion that McNamee really manufactured a chance to cut onto his stronger foot, he delivered an inswinging far post cross which the bustling Grant Holt slid to Jackson for a tap-in. Norwich deservedly led at half time.

More cautious second half

With Middlesbrough so vulnerable to Norwich counter-attacks in the first half, it was only natural that their caretaker boss Steve Agnew was going to make changes. Gary O'Neil was moved to his natural right side, while Nicky Bailey was now on the left man-marking McNamee when Boro didn't have the ball. Bailey's greater positional discipline worked in nullifying McNamee's threat, and he consequently faded out of the game. The match became more slower and more tense as a consequence.

Norwich's counters switched to the left, but Lappin, Smith and Fox were less effective at creating chances, and Norwich slowly dropped deeper in fear of conceding an equaliser. Middlesbrough continued to probe while still lacking cutting edge, despite replacing one SPL goal machine (Kris Boyd) with another (Scott McDonald). Ward and Bennett remained steadfast, and Grant Holt dropped deeper, committing in midfield in a bid not to be isolated - he seems a more than competent target man at this level.

Joe Bennett's introduction at left-back aimed to take advantage of the flagging McNamee and Norwich's increasing narrowness as Middlesbrough's full backs pressed forward. The defensive minded Korey Smith was brought on in McNamee's place, but it didn't prevent Boro from getting their best chance of the game in injury time, as Bailey found McDonald unmarked in Norwich's penalty area only for his shot to trickle wide. Half of Boro's team collapsed to the grass - they knew their chance for a point had gone.

Summary
Paul Lambert's brave decision to ditch the diamond and Hoolahan paid off as Norwich redeemed themselves for their midweek defeat with a disciplined defensive performance, particularly from their two centre backs. Reuniting Ward and Barnett after their regular partnership at Coventry last season demonstrates intelligent management on his part, as does his willingness to change system when required - the diamond is perhaps a better tactic to use when trying to control the game away from home rather than when trying to unlock stubborn visiting defences. Unless his team achieve an unexpected promotion, this highly promising manager probably won't remain in Norwich for too long.

Middlesbrough looked toothless up front, and their attempt to match Norwich's diamond did not play to the strengths of their captain O'Neil - less defensive responsibility should be placed on him. This lack of self-confidence ultimately cost them the game. They certainly have too much ability to be relegated from the Championship, but they need a new manager quickly if they are still going to enjoy anything near the promising season that many expected.

The State of English Football: Part Three

There is no topic as widely discussed within England’s football community as the national team. It is nothing short of an obsession. Interest in the side is practically forced upon youngsters as soon as they are capable of following football. Following the 2010 World Cup, it is a widely-held opinion that thorough changes have to be made in order for England to compete in the coming years – the way that football is reported being among them. Indeed, the media’s collective overexcitement has become as familiar and unsavoury as England’s knockout-stage exits. Although the righteous indignation that follows such events is the most memorable aspect of the coverage, more important is the baseless culture of constant hype that has come to characterise reporting on English players.

Part Three: Improving the National Team: a Cultural Revolution in the Offing?

Above all other issues, the fact that the coaching of English youngsters is stuck in the 1980s is the most concerning. Whilst the Premier League has benefited from the presence of foreign players and continues to do so, one can watch any match from the Championship and below and see a culturally, technically and tactically inflexible brand of football which has no place in the twenty-first century. It is this that truly demonstrates how football is played in England. Pundits and writers alike will argue that the national team has world-class footballers but it is simply not true: they have players with natural talent, but with an innate understanding of football in a form that no longer exists at the highest level.

Whereas the modern game is based on measured tactical movement, passing triangles and the exploitation of small spaces, English football remains obsessed with power, strength and tempo; with physically imposing players, relentless forward movement and heroic sliding tackles. It does not work anymore. It is no coincidence that Frank Lampard played his best football with Claude Makélélé behind him and Didier Drogba in front. Nor is it a fluke that Steven Gerrard was at his most effective with a perfectly configured pairing of Javier Mascherano and Xabi Alonso covering and supplying respectively. Therefore, the fact that Lampard and Gerrard consistently fail when taken away from their drip-fed club lives and made to play with each other is also completely logical. Despite this, they remain national icons, held up as role models for future generations of footballers. In terms of popularising mediocrity, England is miles ahead of the competition.

The belief that English player development is lagging behind has gained significant momentum in recent years. Sir Trevor Brooking has done an admirable job of publicising the issue, and while the Red Tops and reactionaries were busy blaming Johnny Foreigner for the national side’s showing this summer, more rational thinkers opined that England’s Stone Age performances were the direct result of the way young talent in this country is coached – or, to put it more accurately, not coached. According to the Guardian, ‘England has 2,679 coaches holding UEFA's A, B and Pro licences: Spain has 23,995, Italy 29,420 and Germany 34,970.’ With fewer coaches spending less time developing young talent than their supposed rivals, it is no wonder that England’s title challenges exist primarily in the output of a vacuous and jingoistic media.

Some will say that the media is an easy target to apportion blame to. Although it is not the broadcasters and journalists who actually train players, the Sky Sports and Match of the Day teams probably have as much contact time with youngsters as their coaches. With the situation as it is, objective reporting would benefit English football. It does no-one any good when pundits with no real knowledge stir their audience into heightened and unrealistic expectation. To take a memorable example, the BBC’s pre-match coverage of England’s 2006 World Cup quarter-final saw Ian Wright – a paragon of pompous ignorance if ever there was one – state that he could not see how England could possibly lose to Portugal.

It is not as if the potential for more enlightened commentary does not exist: Gary Lineker and Andy Gray, for instance, have shown that they are capable of perceptive analysis and yet both let emotion get the better of them when covering England. Both suggested that Fabio Capello’s nationality was a deciding factor following England’s defeat to Germany in this year’s World Cup. Gray commented that an English manager would have achieved more than Capello and went on to suggest that Alan Shearer or David Beckham succeed the Italian. His justification? “I don’t know what Joachim Löw’s playing career was like,” he said, “but I know it wasn’t very good.” With this verdict, Gray inadvertently imparted to his audience an important lesson: How Not To Think About Football. This is a recurring theme during broadcast football coverage.

The media are responsible for problems greater than blatantly subjective analysis. The recent elevation in status of Andy Carroll, Jack Wilshere and, above all, Joe Hart, is symptomatic of what Jonathan Wilson recently defined as England’s Messiah Complex. Regardless of whether the above are the real deal or not, the Messiah Complex is a media-driven phenomenon which instead of giving players protection and confidence exposes and destroys them. The routine is close to inevitable: established England international drops clanger – is pilloried; youngster emerges with relevant skill-set to problem position; makes impressive progress with club team; plays mistake-free match for national side – becomes Fleet Street darling; eventually drops clanger – is pilloried.

Whilst the cycle is similar to a regular club career, the intensity rises exponentially when applied to the national team and this is another huge problem. The fear of a ferocious and likely unscrupulous backlash can only serve to hamper performance on the biggest stage. As much as every England player remembers the image of Bobby Moore lifting the Jules Rimet trophy, current generations have grown up with the tradition of biennial witch-hunts. Although Ashley Cole may not be the go-to guy for a quote that accurately reflects ninety-nine situations out of one-hundred, he illustrated the Messiah Complex’s effect on today’s internationals when he was driven to say: “I hate England and the f**king people”. Simply put: the media overstep their mark, influencing England matches when they should simply report on them.

This plethora of problems must be addressed by serious reform of football’s current infrastructure. First and foremost, there should be a qualified coach in every school in the United Kingdom, working with youngsters at as early an age as possible. They should accept that football is dynamic and must teach the latest ideas in football theory, thereby breeding well-rounded players who better understand the sport’s mechanics. The proposed National Football Centre at Burton is a must-have: it would facilitate the proliferation of coaches and give the most talented teenagers a platform to step up their learning.

Additionally, the next generation of youngsters needs a more patient, scientific culture to grow up in. If better analysis were available to them they could identify appropriate role models and refine their natural talent. Those who grow up copying the likes of Wayne Rooney and Steven Gerrard are doomed to inherit their failings. Lastly, this process should be allowed to run its course without its products being subjected to the debilitating pressure that currently stalks the national team. The media being an entity realistically detached from the football world, this may be the hardest change to implement. However, to create the atmosphere in which to modernise coaching and give England a chance of joining the world’s footballing elite, it has to happen.

Chicago Fire 1-1 Los Angeles Galaxy: de los Cobos’ gamble pays off, Galaxy fail to shine

The starting lineups.

A slow-burning Major League Soccer game ignited with two late goals, and the Chicago Fire were unlucky not to come away with all three points after a resounding tactical victory. After an even opening twenty minutes a red card for Gonzalo Segares put the Fire on the back foot. Chicago coach Carlos de los Cobos then took a tactical gamble – and Los Angeles played right into his hands.

The recent trend of 4-2-3-1 has not passed MLS by, although in this game Chicago’s interpretation of it was somewhat dynamic and could perhaps be described as closer to 4-3-3. Brian McBride was the lone striker, with Patrick Nyarko and new Designated Player Nery Castillo starting in wide forward positions and John Thorrington as the most advanced of the three central midfielders. Logan Pause and Mike Banner took up more reserved midfield roles.

The Galaxy’s formation was fascinating, and reminiscent of Dunga’s Brazil in that both hinged on an unusually lopsided midfield. Edson Buddle was up front, with Landon Donovan just behind. Tristan Bowen was almost permanently stationed in a very advanced position on the right flank while Alex Cazumba, the left-sided midfielder, shifted inside a little and allowed left-back Todd Dunivant to do most of the work out wide. Jovan Kirovski and Dema Kovalenko, two experienced MLS players, provided the shield in front of the defence, and had little attacking brief to speak of.


The Galaxy's lop-sided midfield.

Left Back in the Dressing Room
The early stages of the match were fairly unremarkable, rather cagey and with each side sounding the other out, as is to be expected in such as important game. Just before the first-half’s midway point, however, Gonzalo Segares was shown a straight red for elbowing Galaxy defender Leonardo. Unsurprisingly, this produced the turning-point of the game – not the resulting penalty, a weak Donovan effort comfortably saved by Sean Johnson, but rather the huge gamble taken by Carlos de los Cobos.

The Fire coach did not respond to the sending-off by sacrificing, say, Castillo or Nyarko for another defender (in fact the Fire’s first substitution was not until the 68th minute). Instead he effectively gave Mike Banner the task of performing the defensive functions of the absent Segares while also continuing to fulfil his own role as a central midfielder. The front three was retained, meaning that Chicago could still use the width of the pitch going forward. In fact the only defensive change was John Thorrington limiting his forward running, giving the Fire a very compact, deep-lying midfield - though Nyarko also helped out by dropping back and carrying the ball out of midfield when Chicago regained possession.


The Fire coped with Segares' sending-off by using Mike Banner in a dual defensive and midfield role.

Banner Flies as Fire Extinguish
Given Chicago’s narrow 3-3-3 formation, the task for the Los Angeles Galaxy became to use their numerical advantage to drag defenders out of position. As much as the Fire defence and Mike Banner in particular were excellent, Galaxy coach Bruce Arena played right into their hands. The Los Angeles attacks were mostly focussed down the right side, where it quickly became apparent that Banner had the better of Tristan Bowen. Bowen also suffered from a lack of support – the right-back and Chris Hughton lookalike Sean Franklin didn’t venture forward at all despite the acres of space left in wide midfield positions by Segares' absence.

Few attacks came down the left, where Todd Dunivant tirelessly dominated the touchline all game while left-midfielder Alex Cazumba shifted infield and pursued a useful if unspectacular shuttling role. When the Galaxy did attack down this side it usually resulted in a corner, a goalscoring chance or at least a meaningful foray into Chicago territory. That Arena failed to recognise the usefulness of the Dunivant-Cazumba partnership is curious - although trying to exploit the apparently vacant left-back spot makes sense, a better strategy might have been to use Bowen as a decoy - his advanced position on the right flank keeping the defence stretched while attacks are concentrated down the left.

The Hit Striker Guiding the Galaxy
Obviously, LA’s success or failure was always likely to depend to some degree on the performance of Landon Donovan. Penalty miss aside, the US international was largely kept quiet. Donovan, deployed just off Edson Buddle, generally drifted slightly to the right and was always looking to make runs into the box. Though his quality showed with some nice touches to bring others into play, he couldn’t provide an incisive pass to unlock the defence.

Donovan may have been better served dropping further back – the Fire sat so deep that there was plenty of space to dictate play from midfield and perhaps draw a Chicago player out of the rigid defensive line. It was telling that, when Mike Magee was brought on, the presence of two orthodox strikers occupying the centre-backs gave Donovan much more freedom to play in front of the defence and pick out the right pass. For the majority of the match, however, Chicago limited space between the lines very well, and Donovan was largely subdued as a result.

Stand back, I’m about to compare Los Angeles Galaxy to Barcelona
Dominating possession is too often equated with dominating the game. In last season’s UEFA Champions League semi-final second-leg, for instance, Barcelona had the lion’s share of the ball while ten-man Internazionale were quite happy to concede the ball and focus on controlling space. Barça didn’t dominate the game and never really looked like proceeding to the final, despite spending the majority of the match in Inter’s half. Mourinho’s tactical masterclass was such that his side could be said to have dominated that match.

It’s an extreme example, and one obviously taken from a much higher level of the game, but some comparisons are valid as Chicago tried to overcome their numerical disadvantage in a similar way. It could therefore be said that, in some respects, the Fire dominated this game. It certainly did not seem a particular injustice when Collins John curled a free-kick inside the far post and seemed to have snatched a victory for the home side, since Chicago had done all they could – restricted the Galaxy’s chances, stifled their best players and taken an opportunity when it fell to them. Although the towering Omar Gonzalez headed a late equaliser from a Donovan corner the tactical victory was still Chicago’s – showing that, in the aftermath of a sending-off, a demonstration of tactical versatility can be a more effective response than a knee-jerk substitution.

The State of English Football: Part Two

World Cups are always watershed events. Reputations are made or destroyed over the course of one month, and the next few years are largely founded on the principles of the preceding tournament. In Part One of this series, it was established that the 2010 World Cup highlighted the Premier League’s decline. Part Two will deal with the probable situation going into the 2014 tournament. Part One also saw criteria set out to define ‘a great league’. Essentially, there must be high-quality teams, players and matches at all levels of the division. With these attributes disappearing from the Premier League at some speed, it is natural to worry that before the next World Cup the division will resemble Ligue 1 between 2001 and 2008.

Part Two: Where The Premier League Is Heading

In terms of competition at the top, the Premier League’s next few seasons appear to be a foregone conclusion. With the correlation between budget and short-term success well-established, it seems obvious that Manchester United and Chelsea will almost certainly fall away, leaving Manchester City to dominate by default. Arsenal, Tottenham and Liverpool can try to stop the Citizens, but each must overcome significant problems to do so.

At the start of the next World Cup season, Manchester United will – barring a miracle – be without the services of Ryan Giggs, Paul Scholes and, most importantly, Sir Alex Ferguson. Although tightened purse-strings mean they currently have promising youngsters in abundance, none of them appear to be the next Cristiano Ronaldo. With the club in £716.5m of debt and the club’s owners themselves struggling financially, it is hard to see United sustaining the strength that has seen them dominate since the Premier League’s inception.

There are two ways they can finance the first team from now on: either a leading star is sold for truly exceptional money, or a number of products of the youth setup are sold each year. The first scenario seems unlikely. With there being only one player they could currently sell for the amount required to bankroll three or four years of spending, the damage the club’s reputation would take presents a significant obstacle. In any case, players will be sold to fund relatively modest additions to the first team – hardly the stuff that supremacy is made of. With the right manager it is possible to challenge using this business model, but whether a manager of sufficient calibre to replace Ferguson is willing to take the reins with the odds so firmly against him is yet to be seen. The words ‘poisoned’ and ‘chalice’ spring to mind.

Chelsea are in a similarly precarious situation. In August 2013 the current contracts of Didier Drogba, Florent Malouda and Nicolas Anelka will have expired. Frank Lampard and John Terry will still have years to run on their deals despite having reached a combined age of sixty-seven, and will still earn a combined weekly wage of around £310k. Roman Abramovich’s finances are obviously somewhat healthier than the Glazers’, but he will not repeat the garish spending that defined his early years as the Blues’ owner. After all, 2009/10 was the season that the club was supposed to break even, yet in December 2009 Chelsea announced a loss of £47m. With their budget so inhibited by their owner’s sensibility and their icons’ salaries, Didier Drogba’s replacement, for example, will probably be coming from football’s equivalent of a bargain bin. With that in mind, a lot rests on the development of youngsters like Gaël Kakuta and Daniel Sturridge.

Inevitably, some will put Liverpool forward as potential challengers. Until the ownership situation is resolved, this notion is unrealistic at best.

As things stand, Arsenal set to be the only current challenger capable of matching City’s financial muscle. Of their current stars, August 2013 will see Thomas Vermaelen aged twenty-seven, Robin van Persie thirty and Cesc Fàbregas at Barcelona. Arsène Wenger has spent the last three or four years repeatedly praising his youngsters’ ability and those in the current squad should have combined talent with experience to sufficient effect to mount a genuine challenge 2013/14. However, there is with Arsenal a series of doubts plaguing their recent history, and consequently their immediate future. Above their predictable tactics, injury-prone players and stubborn manager, the club’s ownership will determine whether they challenge in the coming years.

The probable leveraged takeover that Alisher Usmanov or Stan Kroenke will undertake would have two consequences. Firstly, the club would take on debilitating levels of debt comparable to those of Manchester United. Their spending is currently limited by the fact that they owe £203.6m, but a takeover would see that number rise manyfold. Secondly, having seen his years of patient building ruined, Arsène Wenger would almost certainly resign. Usmanov/Kroenke will arrive with the familiar press conference, announcing the intention to make Arsenal the biggest club in the world and promising a myriad of big-money signings, but without Wenger, it’s hard to see immediate success following at Arsenal.

Contrast these situations with that of Manchester City and there is a very different outlook. In January 2010, Sheikh Mansour paid off the club’s £305m debt. They spent around £125m on players in the summer of 2010 alone. Despite posting a loss of £92.6m for the last financial year, Mansour’s practically limitless wealth makes the figure irrelevant. Unlike Abramovich at Chelsea, he has made no plans to turn a profit by a certain date. Even if this level of spending does not continue, the depth of their squad and backroom staff should see them considered as challengers for every trophy between now and 2016. If they spend another £125m next summer, the Premier League may as well engrave their name on the trophy there and then. It would take serious mismanagement to prevent their victory.

With the recent years’ most successful sides set so awkwardly, there will likely be openings to cement a place in the Premier League’s top four places. Although they certainly won’t win the title within five years, Tottenham are well positioned to become Champions League regulars in that time. The Premier League’s upper echelon was a closed shop until they stole in via the back door last season, and their squad looks strong enough to hold that position. Although Tottenham’s controlling company, ENIC, was affected by the global economic crisis, they carry less debt than their rivals.

There are, however, two important caveats. Firstly, that expansion will be unavoidably slow. Even with Champions League money pouring in, it would be irresponsible of Daniel Levy and Harry Redknapp to plan for anything other than domestic consolidation in the coming seasons. Secondly, with Manchester City set to dominate, Tottenham are the fifth contender for four Champions League spots – sixth, if Liverpool find a suitable owner before 2011/12. With such a challenge ahead, it is clear that 2010/11 will play a huge part in deciding their future.

Of course, all of the above is mere speculation. There is nothing to prevent a billionaire taking control of Liverpool at the end of the season, spending £200m on Lionel Messi, Gerard Piqué and Dani Alves and making the Premier League better than ever. Manchester City’s project could yet be botched. Tottenham could always revert to type and sink into mid-table mediocrity. However, the scenarios explained remain the most probable. Logic dictates that with so many of English football’s giants confronting severe economic problems, the decline in the standard of the Premier League will be accompanied by a decrease in competition. If things looked bad following the 2010 World Cup, just wait to see what lessons 2014 has in store.

The State of English Football: Part One

English football is in the middle of an unprecedented transition. In the wake of the global economic crisis, the Premier League’s levels of debt have garnered substantial negative press. Leveraged takeovers by billionaire businessmen, once portrayed as every fan’s ultimate fantasy, have been unsuccessful in almost all cases, the only variable being when things go sour. The 2010 World Cup exposed the national side so starkly that several years worth of stifled misgivings have come to the fore. The idea of English football’s supremacy, pushed so aggressively by various media until this season, seems more fanciful than ever. There are several concurrent narratives setting the new era up to be one of two things: the most exciting ever, or the beginning of a steep decline. Which is it to be? This series of articles looks at the next chapter in English football’s narrative.

Part One: Where The Premier League Stands In 2010/11

Recently, I was asked for my definition of ‘a great league’. Having given the topic the consideration it deserved, the following criteria comprised my answer:

• Above all else, the teams at the top come the end of the season should be something special. Obviously, vintage sides don’t come along every year, but they should at least be worthy winners, their displays admired continentally as well as domestically.
• Matches should be of a consistently high quality. Even with weaker sides involved, they will at least be organised and of sufficient strength to be competitive.
• Standout players should not be limited to the division’s best teams. Whilst the table-toppers will obviously have more than struggling sides, talent should be visible throughout.
• The tactics favoured should be the most advanced of their time. The pushing of boundaries not only raises the bar in terms of quality, but inherently makes football more exciting.

These points were not the product of utopian thought, but the analysis of what made Serie A so strong throughout the 1990s; what La Liga had at the start of the 2000s; and what the Premier League itself had until recently.

The Premier League’s peak was in 2007/08, with the all-English Champions League final in Moscow. It had been threatened before and was nearly repeated the following year, but that season was the only time it all came together and the division’s two strongest clubs played out a memorable, high-quality and dramatic match – fitting, as it was these attributes that millions bought into with the Premier League. Thierry Henry and Cristiano Ronaldo, in particular, were the standard-bearers of a futuristic brand of football which coupled breakneck speed with immaculate control, often producing unique moments of exhilaration. May 21, 2008 was the culmination of all that had come before. May 22 saw the beginning of the decline.

For me, the Premier League definitively jumped the shark on August 5, 2009, the day Xabi Alonso joined Real Madrid from Liverpool. Loathe as I am to say it, Liverpool should have won the title in the preceding season. Rafa Benítez’s 4-2-3-1 was so obviously the best system, their rivals so clearly limited, that it was only just that they win. However, their relatively weak squad could not meet the demands of challenging for the title and the Champions League simultaneously. Cristiano Ronaldo steamrollered Manchester United to yet another title and, in response, Benítez took leave of his senses, selling his most important player. Ronaldo’s transfer may have broken the records, but it was, to me at least, Alonso’s intelligence and accuracy that would be more conspicuous by its absence. So it proved.

2009/10 was a shocker of a season, and in an effort to avoid nausea I will spend as little time on it as possible. There were several demonstrations of the Premier League’s stagnation. Winners Chelsea scored at least seven goals in a match four times, but also lost six matches – the highest number for a title-winning side since 2001. Manchester United became reliant on Wayne Rooney, who regularly excelled despite his obvious limitations. Liverpool’s slump was as graceless as it was sudden. Burnley, Hull and Portsmouth were so excruciatingly bad that West Ham lost half of their matches and stayed up. Wigan’s goal difference was minus forty-two and they also survived. In short, the standard fell through the floor. The division met none of the criteria to be declared ‘a great league’.

The 2010 World Cup also hit the Premier League’s credibility hard. Its players’ hardships have been covered in great detail, so I will not dwell on them here. Needless to say, the Premier League’s current season has begun with a noticeably more reserved tone from broadcasters. Gary Lineker’s introductions on Match of the Day, for example, exemplify the change: whereas last August he routinely described it as the best league in the world, last weekend’s programme began with Lineker half-heartedly using the day’s two six-nils as evidence of the league’s ability to excite. He did not believe what he was saying and nor should anyone else.

Let’s be clear: the situation is grim. With two rounds of fixtures played in the Premier League, we have seen four six-nil results. Chelsea and Arsenal have between them won three, illustrating that the gulf between the division’s haves and have-nots is wider than ever. With this season featuring the ultimate have-not in Blackpool, we will probably see considerably more thrashings than in any other season. In addition to the lack of competition, there is a dearth of individuals worth watching. In the 2009 FIFA World Player of the Year list, five of the top ten were based in England at the start of the calendar year. In 2008, the number was three, and in 2007, four. In 2010, it would be unsurprising if there was only one, and yet Wayne Rooney’s loss of form could still see him miss out. Following Javier Mascherano’s move to Barcelona, the Premier League has been further weakened: the only player one may nominate as the world’s best in his position is Didier Drogba, aged thirty-two.

Due to the unbalanced level of domestic competition, the tactical standard of English football will only be verifiable once the Champions League’s latter stages are underway. The group stage draw has been kind to Manchester United and Arsenal. Chelsea’s route is slightly more challenging and Tottenham’s appears veritably cruel. Nonetheless, it is not inconceivable that all four progress. If that were to be the case, the Premier League’s giants – and Spurs – will be rank outsiders behind José Mourinho’s Real Madrid and Barcelona. Last season’s finalists, Inter and Bayern Munich, have not weakened. It would take a brave man to bet on there being more than one English semi-finalist. The Premier League may have set the standard over the last few seasons, but in 2010/11, it is undoubtedly in decline.