The key tactical point for Germany was the selection of a
front four containing no number nine. Mario Götze and Marco Reus spent
most of the match interchanging as the notional number nine, making darting
runs between the full-backs and centre-backs and creating space for the ever
astute Thomas Müller to exploit. Lewis Holtby played a slightly more
conservative role, taking possession in advanced positions and recycling. The system
of interchange worked well in periods and could have created a goal for Reus
after twenty-seven minutes, but van Gaal’s plan was more than its equal. Germany could perhaps have done with involving Lahm more in attacking play, but given the threat posed on the counter his conservative display was understandable.
Both teams were keen to attack at set pieces, moving more
men forward on those occasions than at any time in open play, but there was
still no clear chance created from them either directly or on the
counterattack. The most notable set-piece in the match was the corner which Marco
Reus comically shanked almost directly upwards.
Van Gaal’s reactive setup resulted in the lion’s share of
early possession being taken by Germany’s centre-backs, Per Mertesacker and
Mats Hummels. This largely played into Dutch hands: twice during the first
eleven minutes Hummels was sufficiently tempted to try long killer passes and lost
possession on both occasions. Between the tenth and thirtieth minutes Bruno Martins
struggled somewhat due to a lack of cover from Arjen Robben, but eventually he
settled into the game and Robben began to help the Feyenoord youngster.
Germany were comfortable being the proactive side and
despite the lack of clear chances fashioned, one sensed in their young
attackers a belief that their system would win out against the obstinate Dutch defence.
Thomas Müller and Lewis Holtby, in particular, never shied from receiving the
ball and trying to make something happen. İlkay Gündoğan caught the eye, his replication
of Bastian Schweinsteiger’s national team performances more than passable.
Indeed, on thirty minutes it was a little too good: he, along with his midfield
partner Lars Bender, were too high up the pitch and were slow to close down the
advancing Rafa van der Vaart. The Hamburg man skipped between them and his pass
sent Arjen Robben through on goal. The Bayern winger rounded Manuel Neuer but
found Benedikt Höwedes on hand to block his goal-bound shot.
This was an atypical moment in terms of first-half tactics: the
Dutch approach then was to sit deep and wide and get narrow once the ball was inside
their own half, the thinking presumably being that their best chance of success
lay on the counter with the pace of Robben and Ruben Schaken.
Löw’s men were happy to keep the ball at the back, relying
on the movement of their front four tying knots in the Dutch man-marking before
working the ball forward, mostly down the right, in fast transitions. This
produced a couple of half-chances, but like their opponents’, their best
scoring opportunity came from a moment out of keeping with the general tactical
trend. At the end of the first half, Gündoğan made a skilful foray into the
Dutch area and, despite losing the ball, remained forward to slam the ball
goalward when it broke in the ensuing scramble. Unfortunately for the Dortmund
man, Johnny Heitinga had read the danger and blocked the shot on the line.
The second half began with several substitutions from van
Gaal and a change in tact from Jogi Löw. His side sat much deeper and invited
the Dutch onto them. Given the trouble the Germans had finding space to attack
in the first half, this made sense. At the beginning and end of the half, it
also allowed the Dutch to take possession closer to Manuel Neuer’s goal, but there
was little significant danger. For the most part, Germany enjoyed the majority
of the ball. Despite looking potent in periods, their domination was mostly sterile.
As is typical of the twenty-first century international
friendly, the myriad of substitutions in the second half prevented any flow
developing. Most of the clearest shooting chances fell to the Netherlands. On
seventy-six minutes Gündoğan and Bender were again caught too high up the field,
causing Hummels to charge out of the defensive line. This in turn allowed the
Netherlands to break down the right, and Schaken’s cutback was met by the substitute
Daryl Janmaat, whose twenty-yard drive was saved by Neuer. Germany looked
vulnerable again a minute later, but Eljero Elia’s shot from the left channel
was wildly inaccurate. In the last minute, Marco Reus had the chance to win it following
a poor headed clearance, but like Elia minutes before, he ballooned the ball
high and wide. The final whistle followed shortly thereafter.
Whether van Gaal or Löw won the tactical battle is open to
dispute and arguably irrelevant. The information that both camps gleaned from
the ninety minutes will be largely positive. Van Gaal’s side looked organised
and tough but in a different manner to the sides of his predecessor. Löw gave
valuable game time to youngsters like Gündoğan, Holtby and Götze and will be
pleased at their respective performances which, despite the occasional youthful
error, were mature and encouraging. This was a match of little spectacle but it
contained more than enough evidence of progress being made by both sides.
Rob Brown
Rob Brown
