Chicago Fire 1-1 Los Angeles Galaxy: de los Cobos’ gamble pays off, Galaxy fail to shine

The starting lineups.

A slow-burning Major League Soccer game ignited with two late goals, and the Chicago Fire were unlucky not to come away with all three points after a resounding tactical victory. After an even opening twenty minutes a red card for Gonzalo Segares put the Fire on the back foot. Chicago coach Carlos de los Cobos then took a tactical gamble – and Los Angeles played right into his hands.

The recent trend of 4-2-3-1 has not passed MLS by, although in this game Chicago’s interpretation of it was somewhat dynamic and could perhaps be described as closer to 4-3-3. Brian McBride was the lone striker, with Patrick Nyarko and new Designated Player Nery Castillo starting in wide forward positions and John Thorrington as the most advanced of the three central midfielders. Logan Pause and Mike Banner took up more reserved midfield roles.

The Galaxy’s formation was fascinating, and reminiscent of Dunga’s Brazil in that both hinged on an unusually lopsided midfield. Edson Buddle was up front, with Landon Donovan just behind. Tristan Bowen was almost permanently stationed in a very advanced position on the right flank while Alex Cazumba, the left-sided midfielder, shifted inside a little and allowed left-back Todd Dunivant to do most of the work out wide. Jovan Kirovski and Dema Kovalenko, two experienced MLS players, provided the shield in front of the defence, and had little attacking brief to speak of.


The Galaxy's lop-sided midfield.

Left Back in the Dressing Room
The early stages of the match were fairly unremarkable, rather cagey and with each side sounding the other out, as is to be expected in such as important game. Just before the first-half’s midway point, however, Gonzalo Segares was shown a straight red for elbowing Galaxy defender Leonardo. Unsurprisingly, this produced the turning-point of the game – not the resulting penalty, a weak Donovan effort comfortably saved by Sean Johnson, but rather the huge gamble taken by Carlos de los Cobos.

The Fire coach did not respond to the sending-off by sacrificing, say, Castillo or Nyarko for another defender (in fact the Fire’s first substitution was not until the 68th minute). Instead he effectively gave Mike Banner the task of performing the defensive functions of the absent Segares while also continuing to fulfil his own role as a central midfielder. The front three was retained, meaning that Chicago could still use the width of the pitch going forward. In fact the only defensive change was John Thorrington limiting his forward running, giving the Fire a very compact, deep-lying midfield - though Nyarko also helped out by dropping back and carrying the ball out of midfield when Chicago regained possession.


The Fire coped with Segares' sending-off by using Mike Banner in a dual defensive and midfield role.

Banner Flies as Fire Extinguish
Given Chicago’s narrow 3-3-3 formation, the task for the Los Angeles Galaxy became to use their numerical advantage to drag defenders out of position. As much as the Fire defence and Mike Banner in particular were excellent, Galaxy coach Bruce Arena played right into their hands. The Los Angeles attacks were mostly focussed down the right side, where it quickly became apparent that Banner had the better of Tristan Bowen. Bowen also suffered from a lack of support – the right-back and Chris Hughton lookalike Sean Franklin didn’t venture forward at all despite the acres of space left in wide midfield positions by Segares' absence.

Few attacks came down the left, where Todd Dunivant tirelessly dominated the touchline all game while left-midfielder Alex Cazumba shifted infield and pursued a useful if unspectacular shuttling role. When the Galaxy did attack down this side it usually resulted in a corner, a goalscoring chance or at least a meaningful foray into Chicago territory. That Arena failed to recognise the usefulness of the Dunivant-Cazumba partnership is curious - although trying to exploit the apparently vacant left-back spot makes sense, a better strategy might have been to use Bowen as a decoy - his advanced position on the right flank keeping the defence stretched while attacks are concentrated down the left.

The Hit Striker Guiding the Galaxy
Obviously, LA’s success or failure was always likely to depend to some degree on the performance of Landon Donovan. Penalty miss aside, the US international was largely kept quiet. Donovan, deployed just off Edson Buddle, generally drifted slightly to the right and was always looking to make runs into the box. Though his quality showed with some nice touches to bring others into play, he couldn’t provide an incisive pass to unlock the defence.

Donovan may have been better served dropping further back – the Fire sat so deep that there was plenty of space to dictate play from midfield and perhaps draw a Chicago player out of the rigid defensive line. It was telling that, when Mike Magee was brought on, the presence of two orthodox strikers occupying the centre-backs gave Donovan much more freedom to play in front of the defence and pick out the right pass. For the majority of the match, however, Chicago limited space between the lines very well, and Donovan was largely subdued as a result.

Stand back, I’m about to compare Los Angeles Galaxy to Barcelona
Dominating possession is too often equated with dominating the game. In last season’s UEFA Champions League semi-final second-leg, for instance, Barcelona had the lion’s share of the ball while ten-man Internazionale were quite happy to concede the ball and focus on controlling space. Barça didn’t dominate the game and never really looked like proceeding to the final, despite spending the majority of the match in Inter’s half. Mourinho’s tactical masterclass was such that his side could be said to have dominated that match.

It’s an extreme example, and one obviously taken from a much higher level of the game, but some comparisons are valid as Chicago tried to overcome their numerical disadvantage in a similar way. It could therefore be said that, in some respects, the Fire dominated this game. It certainly did not seem a particular injustice when Collins John curled a free-kick inside the far post and seemed to have snatched a victory for the home side, since Chicago had done all they could – restricted the Galaxy’s chances, stifled their best players and taken an opportunity when it fell to them. Although the towering Omar Gonzalez headed a late equaliser from a Donovan corner the tactical victory was still Chicago’s – showing that, in the aftermath of a sending-off, a demonstration of tactical versatility can be a more effective response than a knee-jerk substitution.

Crystal Palace 1-2 Ipswich Town: Two different 4-2-3-1s

Ipswich Town were the winners of an entertaining and unusually high-quality game at Selhurst Park. In terms of the narrative of the game, the turning point was Claude Davis’ red card early in the second half, though the main point of tactical interest lay in both sides’ attempting to exploit the width of the pitch. That the visitors came out on top in this regard was the key to victory.

Crystal Palace lined up with something approximating a 4-2-3-1, but the notation is of limited use given the fluidity of the formation. Neil Danns and Owen Garvan were the two deepest-lying midfielders, with Andy Dorman, Kieron Cadogan and Wilfred Zaha ranged behind the centre-forward Alan Lee. Ipswich started with a similar formation but with more traditional wingers, Andros Townsend and Carlos Edwards, on the left and right flank respectively.

Crystal Palace v Ipswich starting line-ups


A tale of two right-backs
The first half was full of energy and momentum, and both teams tried to capitalise on this by sending players down the right flank. Both the Ipswich right-back Jaime Peters and his Palace counterpart Nathaniel Clyne pushed forward when their team had the ball, while the rest of the back four shifted infield to close the gap.
Although both had a largely attacking brief, Peters and Clyne went about this in different ways. Peters bombed up and down the wing, not only offering wide options for the Ipswich midfield but also freeing up the right-midfielder, Carlos Edwards, to make an impact infield. This strategy worked for Ipswich – although Peters was kept in check by Palace left-back Julian Bennett, the Canadian stretched the home side’s defence and allowed Edwards to take advantage of the space created between left-back and centre-back. It was in this way that Edwards should have opened the scoring, arriving late at the far post to turn Jon Stead’s cross over the bar.
Nathaniel Clyne’s role was similarly attacking, though in getting forward his aim was not to cover the entire flank himself, but rather to overload the Ipswich left side. This tactic enjoyed a degree of success, with Wilfred Zaha and Kieron Cadogan shifting to the right, helping to create 3-versus-2 situations which, with a better final ball, might have produced tangible results. While Ipswich were able to compensate for their right-back’s absence by shifting the rest of the defence over, Jaime Peters’ continual presence out wide meant that Julian Bennett was unable to do the same for Palace. This caused problems for the hosts in other areas.

Palace off the ball (left) and on the ball (right)

Stead and Leadbitter exploit space, Lee isolated
Both Palace and Ipswich deployed lone strikers – Alan Lee for the home side, Jon Stead for the visitors. Stead was well-supported by Grant Leadbitter, the central component of the three players behind the striker, and the two combined well to repeatedly take advantage of the space left by Clyne’s attacking forays.
Alan Lee, meanwhile, was largely isolated up front. The Palace midfield trio of Danns, Garvan and Dorman (nominally the left-midfielder but, as Palace’s attacks were so concentrated down the right, generally moved inside to provide support centrally) sat deep at all times, meaning that even when Lee was able to win headers there was no one breaking from midfield in support. Unlike Stead, who had Leadbitter behind him, Kieron Cadogan’s role was to provide support on whichever flank Palace were attacking, and had little impact in central areas. Ipswich’s dominance in the middle of the park was such that Lee often found himself being marked by Luke Hyam, the defensive midfielder, while the centre-backs Gareth McAuley and Tommy Smith were largely untroubled.

Ipswich in possession

Palace’s deep midfield
As alluded to previously, Palace’s central midfield operated in deep positions. This was mostly to feed passes out to the right, though it also served to prevent Grant Leadbitter from operating effectively ‘between the lines’. Although this had adverse effects, such as isolating the centre-forward, it opened up space from which one of the central defenders to bring the ball forward and perhaps initiate attacks. Unfortunately for Palace, this pocket of space was occupied by Claude Davis, a player hardly renowned for his on-the-ball capabilities. An example, perhaps, of some of the Palace players not being suited to George Burley’s tactical ambitions.

Ipswich quick to make most of numerical advantage
Ipswich took the lead from the spot after Claude Davis hauled down Jon Stead and was sent off, before Leadbitter converted the resultant penalty. The visitors were quick to double their advantage, Grant Leadbitter crossing from the vacated Palace right-back position for Carlos Edwards arrive at the far post and put away an almost identical chance to the one he had missed in the first half. Although Neil Danns pulled one back with a scrappy goal in stoppage time, the match was already decided. That the game was won within a few minutes epitomised its overriding theme – while both sides had a solid system, Ipswich took the points by being quicker to adapt effectively to changing circumstances.