Netherlands 0-0 Germany - Tactical Review

Not a match for fans of highlight reels, this was characterised by tactical discipline and defensive diligence. Louis van Gaal, conscious of the threat posed by Germany’s fluid front four, set up with a deep 4-1-4-1 formation aimed at closing off space and kept this shape throughout. Van Gaal also elected to have his full-backs and central midfielders man-mark their direct opponents – an interesting policy, given that the latter positions were filled by Ibrahim Afellay and Rafael van der Vaart, men hardly renowned for their ability to put in a defensive shift. The plan, however, was a success, with the two remaining organised and tight to their men as well as displaying their obvious quality on the ball.

The key tactical point for Germany was the selection of a front four containing no number nine. Mario Götze and Marco Reus spent most of the match interchanging as the notional number nine, making darting runs between the full-backs and centre-backs and creating space for the ever astute Thomas Müller to exploit. Lewis Holtby played a slightly more conservative role, taking possession in advanced positions and recycling. The system of interchange worked well in periods and could have created a goal for Reus after twenty-seven minutes, but van Gaal’s plan was more than its equal. Germany could perhaps have done with involving Lahm more in attacking play, but given the threat posed on the counter his conservative display was understandable.

Both teams were keen to attack at set pieces, moving more men forward on those occasions than at any time in open play, but there was still no clear chance created from them either directly or on the counterattack. The most notable set-piece in the match was the corner which Marco Reus comically shanked almost directly upwards.

Van Gaal’s reactive setup resulted in the lion’s share of early possession being taken by Germany’s centre-backs, Per Mertesacker and Mats Hummels. This largely played into Dutch hands: twice during the first eleven minutes Hummels was sufficiently tempted to try long killer passes and lost possession on both occasions. Between the tenth and thirtieth minutes Bruno Martins struggled somewhat due to a lack of cover from Arjen Robben, but eventually he settled into the game and Robben began to help the Feyenoord youngster.

Germany were comfortable being the proactive side and despite the lack of clear chances fashioned, one sensed in their young attackers a belief that their system would win out against the obstinate Dutch defence. Thomas Müller and Lewis Holtby, in particular, never shied from receiving the ball and trying to make something happen. İlkay Gündoğan caught the eye, his replication of Bastian Schweinsteiger’s national team performances more than passable. Indeed, on thirty minutes it was a little too good: he, along with his midfield partner Lars Bender, were too high up the pitch and were slow to close down the advancing Rafa van der Vaart. The Hamburg man skipped between them and his pass sent Arjen Robben through on goal. The Bayern winger rounded Manuel Neuer but found Benedikt Höwedes on hand to block his goal-bound shot.

This was an atypical moment in terms of first-half tactics: the Dutch approach then was to sit deep and wide and get narrow once the ball was inside their own half, the thinking presumably being that their best chance of success lay on the counter with the pace of Robben and Ruben Schaken.

Löw’s men were happy to keep the ball at the back, relying on the movement of their front four tying knots in the Dutch man-marking before working the ball forward, mostly down the right, in fast transitions. This produced a couple of half-chances, but like their opponents’, their best scoring opportunity came from a moment out of keeping with the general tactical trend. At the end of the first half, Gündoğan made a skilful foray into the Dutch area and, despite losing the ball, remained forward to slam the ball goalward when it broke in the ensuing scramble. Unfortunately for the Dortmund man, Johnny Heitinga had read the danger and blocked the shot on the line.

The second half began with several substitutions from van Gaal and a change in tact from Jogi Löw. His side sat much deeper and invited the Dutch onto them. Given the trouble the Germans had finding space to attack in the first half, this made sense. At the beginning and end of the half, it also allowed the Dutch to take possession closer to Manuel Neuer’s goal, but there was little significant danger. For the most part, Germany enjoyed the majority of the ball. Despite looking potent in periods, their domination was mostly sterile.

As is typical of the twenty-first century international friendly, the myriad of substitutions in the second half prevented any flow developing. Most of the clearest shooting chances fell to the Netherlands. On seventy-six minutes Gündoğan and Bender were again caught too high up the field, causing Hummels to charge out of the defensive line. This in turn allowed the Netherlands to break down the right, and Schaken’s cutback was met by the substitute Daryl Janmaat, whose twenty-yard drive was saved by Neuer. Germany looked vulnerable again a minute later, but Eljero Elia’s shot from the left channel was wildly inaccurate. In the last minute, Marco Reus had the chance to win it following a poor headed clearance, but like Elia minutes before, he ballooned the ball high and wide. The final whistle followed shortly thereafter.

Whether van Gaal or Löw won the tactical battle is open to dispute and arguably irrelevant. The information that both camps gleaned from the ninety minutes will be largely positive. Van Gaal’s side looked organised and tough but in a different manner to the sides of his predecessor. Löw gave valuable game time to youngsters like Gündoğan, Holtby and Götze and will be pleased at their respective performances which, despite the occasional youthful error, were mature and encouraging. This was a match of little spectacle but it contained more than enough evidence of progress being made by both sides.

Rob Brown

The World XI Challenge

Many moons ago, the splendid @candersonftbl and myself were sitting in Barcelona's El Prat airport, trying to pass the time before our flight back to the UK. This inevitably led to several XI-related gauntlets being thrown down, taken up, exhausted and discarded. I'm pretty sure we got through EPL XIs, La Liga XIs and Great Hair XIs pretty quickly, as we often did back then.

The challenge that I remember best from that day was as follows: to take two representatives from each footballing confederation and create the strongest possible unit of XI and manager. I don't remember much about how we respectively composed our XIs, but I do remember that Charlie was left with one centre-back spot free with only an African choice available and, completely of his own volition, picked Steve Gohouri to fill it. You should remind him of that whenever possible.

For some reason, this challenge popped into my head today and I resolved to confront it again. Here's what I ended up with:


Have a go yourself and send me your XI at @robbro7. If anyone manages to compose a better XI than mine whilst including Shane Smeltz, I'll PayPal them a fiver.

Norwich 1-0 Middlesbrough: Canaries flutter, Smoggies smoulder.

This was an intriguing and occasionally compelling contest between two hard-working sides with contrasting fortunes this season: Norwich, high flying in the Championship playoff places after last season's emphatic promotion from League 1, just snuck it ahead of Boro, the underachieving pre-season title favourites.

Following their unexpected midweek defeat to Crystal Palace, Norwich elected to drop their trademark diamond formation for a flat 4-4-2, with winger Antony McNamee surprisingly starting ahead of the Canaries' conductor last season, Wes Hoolahan. First choice centre-back Elliott Ward also made his return from a one-match suspension. Boro were the ones aiming to provide the sparkle in the centre of midfield with a defensively minded 4-3-1-2, precocious 17 year old Luke Williams drifting between Norwich's defensive and midfield lines. Boro captain Gary O'Neill started in an unusual position as carrilero on the left side of the diamond.


Approximate positions and movements of both sets of players in the first half. Note how O'Neil's forays forward and inside (the yellow line marking where he should be) effectively handed Norwich the right flank, leading to their winning goal.

All right first half (O'Neil gets homesick)

The main pattern of the game was established very early on in the first half. Thanks to their numerical advantage there, Boro found it easier to maintain possession in the centre, while Norwich found themselves having to work predominantly on the break. Norwich seemed fairly content in dealing with the threat Boro offered, tending to either win the ball or give away minor fouls high in their half before innocuous passes could emerge as more sinister attacks. With Leroy Lita and Kris Boyd well supervised by Elliott Ward and Leon Barnett, who both had fantastic games, one got the sense that Boro dictated the play while only occasionally exerting a threat on goal.

The movement of Luke Williams and Gary O'Neil presented the biggest concern for Norwich, but also their biggest outlet. Kevin Thomson remained deep (later, Richard Smallwood), and Nicky Bailey shuttled well, allowing Middlesbrough to retain the ball inside their half. Williams was often the player with the most room, waiting for service in the centre or drifting towards the right flank, providing width to Boro's midfield until their right-back Tony McMahon could overlap. The attacking intentions of McMahon and Bailey made Lappin, Fox and Steven Smith stay fairly deep. It was through Williams' influence that Boro gained some early corners, an O'Neil free-kick which Norwich keeper John Ruddy caught comfortably, and a long shot just wide of the post from Bailey. It was a mature performance from the youngster.

O'Neil, perhaps anxious as a right-footer on the left hand side, tended to move inwards into the space that Williams vacated. This made Boro lopsided, leaving Norwich with constant space on their right flank, and plenty of time to use it before O'Neil could get back and defend. Russell Martin got several key balls through to Simeon Jackson, and Andrew Crofts was a dynamic force in midfield, making charging runs from deep and unluckily striking the post after being left unmarked from a McNamee cross. Because of the sheer amount of time they were given down the right, Norwich were able to construct the better chances, and it was a move down this side which ultimately won them the game.

Anthony McNamee was Norwich's most direct player, with his constant runs at Matthew Bates on the counter-attack providing the most exciting moments of the match. Despite being left-footed, and consequently shown down the line by Bates numerous times, McNamee showed discipline in maintaining Norwich's width where O'Neil couldn't for Boro. His patience was ultimately rewarded. On the one occasion that McNamee really manufactured a chance to cut onto his stronger foot, he delivered an inswinging far post cross which the bustling Grant Holt slid to Jackson for a tap-in. Norwich deservedly led at half time.

More cautious second half

With Middlesbrough so vulnerable to Norwich counter-attacks in the first half, it was only natural that their caretaker boss Steve Agnew was going to make changes. Gary O'Neil was moved to his natural right side, while Nicky Bailey was now on the left man-marking McNamee when Boro didn't have the ball. Bailey's greater positional discipline worked in nullifying McNamee's threat, and he consequently faded out of the game. The match became more slower and more tense as a consequence.

Norwich's counters switched to the left, but Lappin, Smith and Fox were less effective at creating chances, and Norwich slowly dropped deeper in fear of conceding an equaliser. Middlesbrough continued to probe while still lacking cutting edge, despite replacing one SPL goal machine (Kris Boyd) with another (Scott McDonald). Ward and Bennett remained steadfast, and Grant Holt dropped deeper, committing in midfield in a bid not to be isolated - he seems a more than competent target man at this level.

Joe Bennett's introduction at left-back aimed to take advantage of the flagging McNamee and Norwich's increasing narrowness as Middlesbrough's full backs pressed forward. The defensive minded Korey Smith was brought on in McNamee's place, but it didn't prevent Boro from getting their best chance of the game in injury time, as Bailey found McDonald unmarked in Norwich's penalty area only for his shot to trickle wide. Half of Boro's team collapsed to the grass - they knew their chance for a point had gone.

Summary
Paul Lambert's brave decision to ditch the diamond and Hoolahan paid off as Norwich redeemed themselves for their midweek defeat with a disciplined defensive performance, particularly from their two centre backs. Reuniting Ward and Barnett after their regular partnership at Coventry last season demonstrates intelligent management on his part, as does his willingness to change system when required - the diamond is perhaps a better tactic to use when trying to control the game away from home rather than when trying to unlock stubborn visiting defences. Unless his team achieve an unexpected promotion, this highly promising manager probably won't remain in Norwich for too long.

Middlesbrough looked toothless up front, and their attempt to match Norwich's diamond did not play to the strengths of their captain O'Neil - less defensive responsibility should be placed on him. This lack of self-confidence ultimately cost them the game. They certainly have too much ability to be relegated from the Championship, but they need a new manager quickly if they are still going to enjoy anything near the promising season that many expected.

Chicago Fire 1-1 Los Angeles Galaxy: de los Cobos’ gamble pays off, Galaxy fail to shine

The starting lineups.

A slow-burning Major League Soccer game ignited with two late goals, and the Chicago Fire were unlucky not to come away with all three points after a resounding tactical victory. After an even opening twenty minutes a red card for Gonzalo Segares put the Fire on the back foot. Chicago coach Carlos de los Cobos then took a tactical gamble – and Los Angeles played right into his hands.

The recent trend of 4-2-3-1 has not passed MLS by, although in this game Chicago’s interpretation of it was somewhat dynamic and could perhaps be described as closer to 4-3-3. Brian McBride was the lone striker, with Patrick Nyarko and new Designated Player Nery Castillo starting in wide forward positions and John Thorrington as the most advanced of the three central midfielders. Logan Pause and Mike Banner took up more reserved midfield roles.

The Galaxy’s formation was fascinating, and reminiscent of Dunga’s Brazil in that both hinged on an unusually lopsided midfield. Edson Buddle was up front, with Landon Donovan just behind. Tristan Bowen was almost permanently stationed in a very advanced position on the right flank while Alex Cazumba, the left-sided midfielder, shifted inside a little and allowed left-back Todd Dunivant to do most of the work out wide. Jovan Kirovski and Dema Kovalenko, two experienced MLS players, provided the shield in front of the defence, and had little attacking brief to speak of.


The Galaxy's lop-sided midfield.

Left Back in the Dressing Room
The early stages of the match were fairly unremarkable, rather cagey and with each side sounding the other out, as is to be expected in such as important game. Just before the first-half’s midway point, however, Gonzalo Segares was shown a straight red for elbowing Galaxy defender Leonardo. Unsurprisingly, this produced the turning-point of the game – not the resulting penalty, a weak Donovan effort comfortably saved by Sean Johnson, but rather the huge gamble taken by Carlos de los Cobos.

The Fire coach did not respond to the sending-off by sacrificing, say, Castillo or Nyarko for another defender (in fact the Fire’s first substitution was not until the 68th minute). Instead he effectively gave Mike Banner the task of performing the defensive functions of the absent Segares while also continuing to fulfil his own role as a central midfielder. The front three was retained, meaning that Chicago could still use the width of the pitch going forward. In fact the only defensive change was John Thorrington limiting his forward running, giving the Fire a very compact, deep-lying midfield - though Nyarko also helped out by dropping back and carrying the ball out of midfield when Chicago regained possession.


The Fire coped with Segares' sending-off by using Mike Banner in a dual defensive and midfield role.

Banner Flies as Fire Extinguish
Given Chicago’s narrow 3-3-3 formation, the task for the Los Angeles Galaxy became to use their numerical advantage to drag defenders out of position. As much as the Fire defence and Mike Banner in particular were excellent, Galaxy coach Bruce Arena played right into their hands. The Los Angeles attacks were mostly focussed down the right side, where it quickly became apparent that Banner had the better of Tristan Bowen. Bowen also suffered from a lack of support – the right-back and Chris Hughton lookalike Sean Franklin didn’t venture forward at all despite the acres of space left in wide midfield positions by Segares' absence.

Few attacks came down the left, where Todd Dunivant tirelessly dominated the touchline all game while left-midfielder Alex Cazumba shifted infield and pursued a useful if unspectacular shuttling role. When the Galaxy did attack down this side it usually resulted in a corner, a goalscoring chance or at least a meaningful foray into Chicago territory. That Arena failed to recognise the usefulness of the Dunivant-Cazumba partnership is curious - although trying to exploit the apparently vacant left-back spot makes sense, a better strategy might have been to use Bowen as a decoy - his advanced position on the right flank keeping the defence stretched while attacks are concentrated down the left.

The Hit Striker Guiding the Galaxy
Obviously, LA’s success or failure was always likely to depend to some degree on the performance of Landon Donovan. Penalty miss aside, the US international was largely kept quiet. Donovan, deployed just off Edson Buddle, generally drifted slightly to the right and was always looking to make runs into the box. Though his quality showed with some nice touches to bring others into play, he couldn’t provide an incisive pass to unlock the defence.

Donovan may have been better served dropping further back – the Fire sat so deep that there was plenty of space to dictate play from midfield and perhaps draw a Chicago player out of the rigid defensive line. It was telling that, when Mike Magee was brought on, the presence of two orthodox strikers occupying the centre-backs gave Donovan much more freedom to play in front of the defence and pick out the right pass. For the majority of the match, however, Chicago limited space between the lines very well, and Donovan was largely subdued as a result.

Stand back, I’m about to compare Los Angeles Galaxy to Barcelona
Dominating possession is too often equated with dominating the game. In last season’s UEFA Champions League semi-final second-leg, for instance, Barcelona had the lion’s share of the ball while ten-man Internazionale were quite happy to concede the ball and focus on controlling space. Barça didn’t dominate the game and never really looked like proceeding to the final, despite spending the majority of the match in Inter’s half. Mourinho’s tactical masterclass was such that his side could be said to have dominated that match.

It’s an extreme example, and one obviously taken from a much higher level of the game, but some comparisons are valid as Chicago tried to overcome their numerical disadvantage in a similar way. It could therefore be said that, in some respects, the Fire dominated this game. It certainly did not seem a particular injustice when Collins John curled a free-kick inside the far post and seemed to have snatched a victory for the home side, since Chicago had done all they could – restricted the Galaxy’s chances, stifled their best players and taken an opportunity when it fell to them. Although the towering Omar Gonzalez headed a late equaliser from a Donovan corner the tactical victory was still Chicago’s – showing that, in the aftermath of a sending-off, a demonstration of tactical versatility can be a more effective response than a knee-jerk substitution.

The New Holding Midfielder

The development of the advanced playmaker has always been closely linked with that of the holding midfielder. Proactive and reactive. Creator and destroyer. And the holder has always developed as a shadow and a mirror image of the creator – where tactical innovation has opened a pocket of space for the playmaker, an equal and opposite reaction takes place in an attempt to stifle it. For every Zidane there is a Makélélé, for every Riquelme a Mascherano. The role of the playmaker has changed, but what impact has this had on the holding midfielder? How is the role of the destroyer changing in the modern game?

The playmaker is in a continual state of flux, going through a series of different incarnations. At the top level of modern football the old-fashioned, foot-on-the-ball trequartista is obsolete, negated by the rise of tactically-disciplined destroyers like Claude Makélélé whose role is to stifle creative play ‘between the lines’.

This doesn’t mean that the playmaker has disappeared, but that the effective area for creative play has shifted. Specifically, it’s shifted out to wider areas of the pitch. Advanced playmakers either start as a wide midfielder and drift inside (like Luka Modric often does for Tottenham) or start centrally but move into wider areas (like Aaron Hunt at Werder Bremen).

So what does this mean for the holding midfielder? The ‘Makélélé role’ entailed protecting the centre-backs, but the preferred method of unlocking a defence has changed – playmakers now look to exploit the gap between full-back and centre-back. This change could be seen during the World Cup – Spain would often deploy a wide player (initially Jesús Navas and later Pedro Rodríguez) on the right, obliging the opposing left-back to hold a wide position, thereby stretching the defence and manufacturing a gap for a creative player such as Andrés Iniesta to exploit. The gap between full-back and centre-back is therefore increasingly requiring of protection – necessitating the evolution of a new breed of holding midfielder.

How, then, will the new breed differ from its progenitor? First and foremost, the new holding midfielder will not have the brief of directly negating a particular player – the role is more focussed on controlling space. As such, interceptions will be as important a method of gaining possession as tackling, if not more important. This new type of midfielder also needs to be mobile and more technically adept than its predecessors – teams can increasingly ill-afford to field specialists at the highest level of football.

There are current examples of this type of player. Javier Mascherano is perhaps the prototype of the new holding midfielder – covering the full-backs and shutting down space in wide areas – but he is technically limited. A truer example would be Sergio Busquets. Agile, intelligent and possessing of a rare tactical awareness, Busquets is indisputably a holding midfielder, but of a kind almost unrecognisable to Makélélé or Gilberto Silva.

During the World Cup final, Busquets was quick to provide cover on the left side to shut down Arjen Robben – exactly the sort of player to potentially pose a threat between full-back and centre-back. He was also the second-highest passer in the tournament, making over 200 more passes than Mascherano – remarkable even when taking into account that the Argentine played two games fewer. Even more notably, Busquets was undeniably effective in winning possession, yet was far from the most prolific tackler in the tournament – an indication of the increased importance of positional discipline, of knowing how to be in the right place at the right time to intercept a pass.

This is, of course, not the final stage of development. No doubt this evolution of the holding midfielder will open up space in another area of the pitch, which will eventually be exploited. The next tactical innovation is only ever the blink of an eye away, and a corresponding defensive manoeuvre will never be far behind.

Crystal Palace 1-2 Ipswich Town: Two different 4-2-3-1s

Ipswich Town were the winners of an entertaining and unusually high-quality game at Selhurst Park. In terms of the narrative of the game, the turning point was Claude Davis’ red card early in the second half, though the main point of tactical interest lay in both sides’ attempting to exploit the width of the pitch. That the visitors came out on top in this regard was the key to victory.

Crystal Palace lined up with something approximating a 4-2-3-1, but the notation is of limited use given the fluidity of the formation. Neil Danns and Owen Garvan were the two deepest-lying midfielders, with Andy Dorman, Kieron Cadogan and Wilfred Zaha ranged behind the centre-forward Alan Lee. Ipswich started with a similar formation but with more traditional wingers, Andros Townsend and Carlos Edwards, on the left and right flank respectively.

Crystal Palace v Ipswich starting line-ups


A tale of two right-backs
The first half was full of energy and momentum, and both teams tried to capitalise on this by sending players down the right flank. Both the Ipswich right-back Jaime Peters and his Palace counterpart Nathaniel Clyne pushed forward when their team had the ball, while the rest of the back four shifted infield to close the gap.
Although both had a largely attacking brief, Peters and Clyne went about this in different ways. Peters bombed up and down the wing, not only offering wide options for the Ipswich midfield but also freeing up the right-midfielder, Carlos Edwards, to make an impact infield. This strategy worked for Ipswich – although Peters was kept in check by Palace left-back Julian Bennett, the Canadian stretched the home side’s defence and allowed Edwards to take advantage of the space created between left-back and centre-back. It was in this way that Edwards should have opened the scoring, arriving late at the far post to turn Jon Stead’s cross over the bar.
Nathaniel Clyne’s role was similarly attacking, though in getting forward his aim was not to cover the entire flank himself, but rather to overload the Ipswich left side. This tactic enjoyed a degree of success, with Wilfred Zaha and Kieron Cadogan shifting to the right, helping to create 3-versus-2 situations which, with a better final ball, might have produced tangible results. While Ipswich were able to compensate for their right-back’s absence by shifting the rest of the defence over, Jaime Peters’ continual presence out wide meant that Julian Bennett was unable to do the same for Palace. This caused problems for the hosts in other areas.

Palace off the ball (left) and on the ball (right)

Stead and Leadbitter exploit space, Lee isolated
Both Palace and Ipswich deployed lone strikers – Alan Lee for the home side, Jon Stead for the visitors. Stead was well-supported by Grant Leadbitter, the central component of the three players behind the striker, and the two combined well to repeatedly take advantage of the space left by Clyne’s attacking forays.
Alan Lee, meanwhile, was largely isolated up front. The Palace midfield trio of Danns, Garvan and Dorman (nominally the left-midfielder but, as Palace’s attacks were so concentrated down the right, generally moved inside to provide support centrally) sat deep at all times, meaning that even when Lee was able to win headers there was no one breaking from midfield in support. Unlike Stead, who had Leadbitter behind him, Kieron Cadogan’s role was to provide support on whichever flank Palace were attacking, and had little impact in central areas. Ipswich’s dominance in the middle of the park was such that Lee often found himself being marked by Luke Hyam, the defensive midfielder, while the centre-backs Gareth McAuley and Tommy Smith were largely untroubled.

Ipswich in possession

Palace’s deep midfield
As alluded to previously, Palace’s central midfield operated in deep positions. This was mostly to feed passes out to the right, though it also served to prevent Grant Leadbitter from operating effectively ‘between the lines’. Although this had adverse effects, such as isolating the centre-forward, it opened up space from which one of the central defenders to bring the ball forward and perhaps initiate attacks. Unfortunately for Palace, this pocket of space was occupied by Claude Davis, a player hardly renowned for his on-the-ball capabilities. An example, perhaps, of some of the Palace players not being suited to George Burley’s tactical ambitions.

Ipswich quick to make most of numerical advantage
Ipswich took the lead from the spot after Claude Davis hauled down Jon Stead and was sent off, before Leadbitter converted the resultant penalty. The visitors were quick to double their advantage, Grant Leadbitter crossing from the vacated Palace right-back position for Carlos Edwards arrive at the far post and put away an almost identical chance to the one he had missed in the first half. Although Neil Danns pulled one back with a scrappy goal in stoppage time, the match was already decided. That the game was won within a few minutes epitomised its overriding theme – while both sides had a solid system, Ipswich took the points by being quicker to adapt effectively to changing circumstances.

Why forward-thinking coaches are thinking without forwards

Can football be played without strikers? Is it possible for a team to be successful without them? Football formations have developed from the 2-3-5 of the early 20th century to the range of 4-5-1 systems we see regularly today. Is the lone striker the final stage of development, or is there still room for tactical innovation? The possibility of a 4-6-0 is being increasingly discussed, but is the system workable? And is it already in use?

The notation 4-6-0 means any formation without strikers: there are many variants on the idea, never featuring a flat six-man midfield, but rather a midfield split into two or sometimes three bands. The concept is based on a fluid midfield, in which all members are accomplished at defending and attacking, and more than one is capable of adopting the de facto centre-forward position. Naturally the system requires high levels of fitness and technical ability, but these are not unrealistic demands at the top level of modern football.

There are early indications that such a system could be prevalent in the future, the most successful example being the Manchester United side of 2007-08, which won the Premier League and Champions League. The formation can be most accurately described as a 4-2-4-0 (the middle two numbers here indicate that the six midfielders are split into two bands). The forward line usually consisted of Wayne Rooney and Cristiano Ronaldo plus two from Luis Nani, Ryan Giggs, Park Ji-Sung and Carlos Tévez, while the two more withdrawn midfielders were Michael Carrick and either Anderson, Paul Scholes, Darren Fletcher or Owen Hargreaves. The system allowed Ronaldo, Tévez or Rooney to act as the 'striker' while the other midfielders did the necessary pressing and defensive work. In practise, it was Ronaldo who most successfully took the more advanced role, leading to him scoring a remarkable 42 goals, the tireless running of less spectacular players like Park Ji-Sung providing a platform for his talent. It isn't the perfect example of a fluid strikerless formation, as the driving force behind it was not so much midfield universality as a reliance on Ronaldo's individual capacity to create and score goals, and it isn't one that can be easily repeated by other teams: there is, after all, only one Cristiano Ronaldo. But it does offer a glimpse of how a football team can function successfully without a recognised centre-forward.

United aren't the only example. An improbable injury list forced Everton to play some of the 2008-09 season without a centre-forward. An advanced midfield role was being adopted by Tim Cahill and sometimes also Marouane Fellaini, while Luciano Spalletti began experimenting with something approximating a 4-5-1-0 or an adapted 4-1-4-1 at Roma, with Daniele De Rossi and Simone Perrotta running beyond the playmaker Francesco Totti. Everton's system is unlikely to be repeated due to the return of their strikers from injury, but it is still worth looking at. It centred around high levels of positional organisation and work-rate, relying largely on the ability of Cahill, Fellaini and Joleon Lescott to capitalise on the set-piece delivery of Mikel Arteta. Much of the closing down and off-the-ball running was performed by the wide midfielders Leon Osman and Steven Pienaar. Spalletti's Roma, by contrast, deploy two 'shuttling' central midfielders in De Rossi and Perrotta, as well as David Pizarro in a more withdrawn role. This creates space for the forward running of the wingers, as well as the individual talent of Totti. Both Everton and Roma have benefited from their tactical bravery – in 2008-09, Everton finished an admirable 5th place in the Premier League and reached the FA Cup final, while Roma finished league runners-up in the first three seasons of Spalletti’s management, as well as lifting the Coppa Italia in 2007 and 2008.

If it’s theoretically viable, then, for a 4-6-0 to succeed, why isn’t everyone using it? There are still significant obstacles to the tactic being adopted more universally. A system without strikers requires both extraordinary levels of fitness and extremely high-quality players. It's telling that the three examples detailed above come from successful, relatively wealthy clubs who perennially finish in the top half of their domestic leagues. The system is unlikely to take on among smaller teams, who lack the physical capacity and standard of players to achieve the fluidity and universality required. Neither is a 4-6-0 likely to be adopted by international sides, as its success depends on the players spending a great deal of time together, a luxury only afforded to club teams. Another threat to the proliferation of 4-6-0 is the recent emergence of more ‘universal’ strikers, such as David Villa and Samuel Eto’o, who offer teams the qualities which previously required two players - both goal threat and defensive consciousness, athleticism in tandem with technical proficiency. However, the recent success of Manchester United, and the promising inroads made by Luciano Spalletti, could inspire others to attempt a similar experiment. Tactics are, in some respects, the search for perfect fluidity, and at the highest levels of club football a formation without strikers could be the next step towards that elusive ideal.